I propose a new name for an important metaethical distinction: bosonic vs. fermionic moral theories. Bosons are particles that can degenerately occupy the same state, while fermions can only occupy individual states.

Bosonic moral theories value multiple copies of the same moral patient experiencing identical states, like perfect bliss. Under these theories, “tiling the universe in hedonium” is permissible, because new copies experiencing the same qualia have nonzero moral value. A “bosonic moral utopia” could look like the entire universe filled with minds experiencing infinite bliss.

Fermionic moral theories value new moral patients only insofar as they have different experiences. “Moral degeneracy pressure” would disfavor the creation of identical copies, as they would be treated like “pointers” to the original, rather than independent moral patients. Under these theories, inequality and maybe even some suffering entities are permissible if higher value states are already occupied by other entities. A “fermionic moral utopia” could look like the universe filled with minds experiencing infinitesimally varying distinct positive experiences.